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Inter-municipal cooperation and costs: Expectations and evidence 
 
 
1. Introduction  
Many developed economies have been hit hard by the economic crisis that began in 2008. This crisis 
has caused serious tensions in government finances, which have affected the countries of southern 
Europe and Ireland in the Eurozone. While deficit orientations are important at the country level, 
following Maastricht criteria for public finance stability, these constraints have strong impacts at the 
local level, because many central governments have mandated strict deficit objectives to local 
governments, which face a more limited tax base and stronger fiscal competition. European 
Commission requirements regarding competition in services of general economic interest have had an 
impact on local government especially as a result of austerity (Warner and Clifton, 2014). Thus, the 
fiscal crisis intensifies the need for local governments to rethink service delivery in order to increase the 
efficiency of locally provided services.  
A policy traditionally proposed to reduce costs is the consolidation of municipalities. Although 
it can be either compulsory or voluntary, in practice most experience worldwide has had a compulsory 
character, given the usual reluctance of municipalities to merge. However, results on cost reduction 
from amalgamation have not met expectations; cost savings are the exception and many times costs 
grow as a result of consolidation, as most case studies reviewed in Bish (2001), Dollery and Johnson 
(2005), Fox and Gurley (2006) and Holzer and Fry (2011) show. No cost savings is the usual result 
found by the most robust empirical studies conducted for different countries around the world (Allers 
and Geertsema 2012). 
Another policy assumed to address problems of scale is privatization of service delivery.  Here 
again, results on cost savings are mixed (Boyne 1998, Hodge 2000, Bel, Fageda and Warner 2010) and 
attributed to lack of competition, early exhaustion of any scale economies, and inadequate before and 
after accounting of costs. Most studies find less frequent contracting in small and rural municipalities, 
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although in the US contracting rates have increased in rural municipalities in 2007 (Hefetz, Warner and 
Vigoda-Gadot, 2012). Rural areas appear to be more reluctant to contract because transaction costs do 
not compensate potential efficiency gains of small scale (Bel and Miralles 2003), and because fewer 
private providers are available in small and rural areas (Warner and Hefetz, 2002b; Warner 2006; Bel 
and Fageda, 2011; Hefetz and Warner, 2012; Johnston and Girth, 2012). In this context, it is interesting 
and timely to analyze the potential that inter-municipal/ inter-local cooperation offers to municipalities 
to improve efficiency and effectiveness of public service delivery. Cooperation has received far less 
attention than privatization, and the literature is still scarce with respect to cost evaluation.  
The potential of sharing services as an alternative metropolitan regional governance reform was 
envisaged half a century ago by Ostrom, Tiebout and Warren (1961, p. 836), when they suggested that 
small municipalities could make use of special arrangements to act jointly to provide services when the 
municipal boundary is suboptimal. Furthermore, this can help small municipalities confront limited 
managerial and technical capabilities (Deller and Rudnicki, 1992), and also help municipalities to 
confront problems of fiscal stress (Zafra-Gómez et al, forthcoming). Shared services delivery is a 
widespread phenomenon, and is particularly intense in small municipalities (Warner and Hefetz, 2003, 
Bel and Costas, 2006; Carr, LeRoux, and Shrestha, 2009; Warner, 2011). However, systematic evidence 
on the relationship between inter-municipal cooperation and costs is scant and contradictory, and 
evidence on its role in promoting regional coordination is equally limited. 
 The objective of our paper is to provide a rationale for the existence of diverging empirical results 
on inter-municipal cooperation and costs. First we analyze the theoretical background relevant for the 
economic and governance effects of inter-municipal cooperation. We pay special attention to (1) the 
cost structure of public services, particularly those related to scale and density economies, and 
externalities, and (2) the structure of local government (size, metropolitan location, powers granted by 
the nation or regional state), and 3) the transactions costs of the governance arrangement. Transaction 
costs result from service characteristics, city characteristics, institutional design and organizational 
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arrangements and these last two are of particular interest in public administration (Frederickson and 
Smith 2003, Feiock 2007 & 2013, Hefetz and Warner 2012). After establishing our theoretical 
framework, we review the existing multivariate empirical evidence. We are able to identify the 
characteristics of cost structure and service delivery governance that should be considered under 
cooperation and the importance of differing national structures of local government systems on the 
scope of cooperation reforms. We conclude with a discussion of what cooperation can and cannot 
achieve and directions for future research.  
 
2. What is cooperation? 
Cooperation in service delivery is a concept that encompasses a variety of forms, which widen 
as we adopt an international comparative approach. Useful characterizations for shared service 
arrangements are found in the public administration literature. Agranoff and McGuire (2003, pp. 43-44) 
and McGuire and Agranoff (2011) model shared services as the intersection of two dimensions, the 
intensity of collaborative activity by a city and the extent to which this activity is strategic. Feiock and 
Scholz (2010, 16) emphasize autonomy, understood as the ease of entry and exit from a collaborative 
agreement, as a key dimension to delimit different types of cooperative arrangements. Feiock (2009) 
adds the number of actors involved as an additional dimension to categorize the arrangements (bi-
lateral, multi-lateral). 
In Europe these types of cooperation can take the form of joint corporations or administrative 
organizations where the different municipalities involved shared ownership and production, as happens 
in Norway (Sørensen 2007), Finland (Haveri and Airaksinen, 2007), Spain (Warner and Bel, 2008), The 
Netherlands (Bel, Dijkgraaf, Fageda and Gradus, 2010; Gradus, Dijkgraaf and  Wassenar, 2014), and 
Italy (Garrone, Grilli and Rousseau, 2013). The collaborative may jointly produce a service or several 
services, contract it to one of the members, or contract to an outside party – either for profit or non-
profit. Interestingly, interlocal contracting is very scarce in Europe. For instance, it is virtually non-
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existent in Spain (Warner and Bel, 2008); in other cases, its relevance is very small, as in the 
Netherlands, where only 4% of municipalities contract solid waste collection to neighboring 
municipalities, whereas 15% of municipalities use intermunicipal cooperation by means of joint delivery 
(Bel et al, 2010; Gradus, Dijkgraaf and Wassenaar, 2014). By contrast, in the US interlocal contracting is 
more common than joint production (Warner and Hebdon, 2001). Because our paper deals with the 
European experience, interlocal contracting will receive less attention hereafter. 
Cooperation is often implemented by higher tier local governments, such as counties in the US, or 
comarcas in Spain and communauté de communes in France. Spanish comarcas are financed with regional and 
(voluntary) municipal transfers, different from the French communauté de communes, which enjoy direct 
taxing power (Guengant and Leprince, 2006). In both Spain and France, governing bodies of the joint 
authority are formed with representatives of the local councils, and these last retain authority regarding 
the local shared service. Thus, they can exit the cooperation without important transaction costs or 
time constraints (Bel, Fageda and Mur 2014). In the US, exit is also an option and the ability to 
maintain shared service arrangements over time is challenged by shifting interests of constituent 
partners. To address this concern some countries have created entities that provide coordination and 
technical assistance to partner municipalities such as regional organization councils in Australia, 
regional districts in British Columbia and boards of cooperative educational services in New York 
(Holzer and Fry 2011, Sancton 2005). 
Several key distinctions can be made regarding the most important characteristics of the different 
types of cooperative arrangements. Regarding the degree of institutionalization, cooperation ranges 
from informal to formal arrangements. Among the formal ones, we can distinguish between standing 
bureaucratic organizations and contractual agreements. Regarding the type of tasks performed, 
cooperative arrangements can be operational in nature (directly engaging in service delivery) or 
coordinative in nature (such as Councils of Government). Regarding the quantity of functions 
performed, they can be single-purpose or multi-purpose. Governance of cooperative arrangements can 
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be a single entity or multi-governmental. Finally, the governing boards can be formed with elected 
representatives or with appointed managers. 
Interestingly, informal cooperation is much less frequent in Europe than in the US (Hulst and van 
Montfort, 2007; Warner, 2011). Informal cooperation is frequent in areas (such as fire, roads and 
police) where power in the US is municipal, whereas power in most EU countries is either regional or 
central. Therefore, informal cooperation is a more important issue in the US. This helps us understand 
why European scholars do not usually pay attention to informal cooperation,1 and why public policy 
debates and research on interlocal/inter-municipal cooperation in Europe do not address concerns 
related to equity and regionalism (see Hulst and van Montfort 2007 for Western European countries, 
and Swianiewicz 2011 for Central and Eastern European countries), which figures importantly in US 
research (Foster 1997, Lowery 2000, Warner and Hefetz 2002a, Warner 2006, Feiock 2007). 
Even if higher tier governments provide incentives or a legal framework for cooperation, 
cooperation among local governments is voluntary (Feiock, 2008). The possibility of exit is an 
important feature of cooperation and ease of exit varies across types of cooperative agreements. Exit is 
easiest in contractual arrangements and in communautés de communes and comarcas (where municipalities 
can exit the cooperation for a specific service, but remain members of the institution); and has more 
constraints in standing bureaucratic organizations (joint production and ownership) and in joint 
purchase (if no huge investment in sunk capital is involved). In practice the most difficult cooperative 
agreements to exit are districts and authorities, where separate governments have been created with the 
specific purpose of governing the cooperation. 
In Europe governments have competences, which have been established compulsorily by either 
national or regional laws. Local governments can deliver services beyond their legal obligations, but 
they cannot avoid providing basic services. In contrast, distribution of powers in the US differs by state 
                                                        
1 Some exceptions exist, of course, such as that of regional conferences (Regionalkonferenzen) networks and forums 
in Germany (Heinz, 2007), and county councils in Romania (Stănuş, 2011), which have similarities with the more 
widespread Councils of Governments in the US. 
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and many local services are optional.  Joint production by municipalities is much less frequent in the 
US and less likely to be enforced than in some European countries. This explains why equity and 
externality concerns, which drive much US interest in cooperation, are not central concerns in the 
European literature.  Bennet (1993) has made a distinction between local governments as community-
based organizations that articulate political participation and local governments as agents close to 
consumers for the delivery of services. Local governments are community-based in southern European 
countries, whereas Nordic countries are more characterized by the service delivery type of local 
government (Hulst and van Montfort 2007, Wollmann 2010). As a result, national regulations impose 
more limits and constraints to cooperative agreements in Northern than in Southern European 
countries. 
 
3. Theoretical issues 
In this section we analyze the theoretical background relevant for the effects of inter-municipal 
cooperation.  
3.1 Economic Theory: Costs and scale 
Many government-provided services are subject to returns to scale and problems of sub-optimal 
jurisdiction size may arise (Lago-Peñas and Martinez-Vazquez, 2013). The optimal size for service 
provision has formed an essential part of the literature on local government (Hirsch 1959, Oates 1972, 
and Dixit 1973). The optimal geographic scale crucially depends on three dimensions: volume of 
service, size of population, and dispersion of population (Deller 1992, Ladd 1992). These have different 
implications for returns to scale.  
Economies of scale exist when average cost decreases as production increases. For example, a small 
municipality might not make full use of the load capacity of a truck, or have too small a demand for 
fuel to command a competitive price in the market place. When the average cost reduction is due to the 
fixed cost being spread across a larger number of users, economies of density exist. For example, increasing 
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population density allows an increase in the number of consumers connected to the urban water 
network. Economies of scope exist when the average cost decreases as the number of services produced by 
the same infrastructure increases, or because several phases in the production process are integrated, 
for example waste collection, recycling and methane digesting. Returns to scale enable a single entity to 
produce all services at a lower cost than would be incurred by two or more entities. The existence of 
these different types of returns to scale requires one pay attention to the economic characteristics of the 
service, because different services will exhibit different conditions of delivery in order to exploit returns 
to scale. 
Inter-municipal cooperation can be used as a formula to exploit returns to scale, as it allows an 
increase in service output and the population using a service or an infrastructure. As suggested in the 
seminal work by Ostrom, Tiebout and Warren (1961, p. 837), voluntary cooperation among 
municipalities is one of the different formulae (together with reconstitution of boundaries and turning 
services to other levels of government) that can be used when looking for an appropriate match 
between the interests affecting and affected by public transactions. This is illustrated by figure 1 for 
economies of scale, for a service where cost depends on the level of output (decreasing Average Cost as 
shown by the line labeled AC). The vertical axis shows prices (P) and the horizontal axis displays 
service quantities (Q, output). Under delivery provided by a Single Municipality (demand DSM), the 
minimum price will be P1 (assuming price equals average cost and the service is self financed), 
corresponding to the average cost at DSM level. If that municipality engages in cooperation, the 
aggregation of the demand by multiple municipalities (demand DMM) allows a lower average cost (AC 
at DMM level) to be achieved, and thus a minimum price equal to P2. The shaded area in figure 1 
represents the potential welfare gains obtained by the cooperating municipality. 
  
(Insert Figure 1: Scale economies and cooperation, about here) 
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The analysis above has paid attention to returns to scale that focus on the production function 
of the service and the volume of service provided. This is the most important efficiency motivation for 
inter-municipal cooperation. Other sources of inefficiencies, such as density economies and 
externalities might be addressed by cooperation as well. Some services might be characterized by 
economies of density because networks are important in the delivery of that service. These networks 
frequently go beyond the municipal jurisdiction in the areas such as metropolitan transportation, 
watershed management, urban water distribution (in contiguous cities), etc. Therefore, inter-municipal 
cooperation might allow the cooperating jurisdictions to benefit from economies of density. Note this 
can imply more service provided and higher overall costs, although average cost decreases.  
Municipalities can also benefit from cooperation to address externalities that result from 
uncoordinated actions of local jurisdictions. In areas such as storm water management, road 
maintenance or control of pollution, decisions taken by one municipality can positively or negatively 
affect residents in a neighboring municipality. In such cases, cooperation can allow a more efficient 
delivery of the service because it might be a means to internalize externalities. Its effects on costs are 
ambiguous, because it can also have the consequence of increasing costs as the overall cross-
jurisdictional efficacy of delivery rises.  Issues related to inter-municipal networks and externalities are 
related to space and organization of local government, and now we turn to this topic. 
 
3.2 Structure of Local Government 
The US and several European countries (notably Spain, Italy and France) face a local 
government structure with many very small municipalities. Fragmented local government systems face 
the challenge of providing services efficiently and addressing problems of service spillovers and tax 
exporting (Lago-Peñas and Martinez-Vazquez, 2013). In the US many scholars argue that when 
regional governance is voluntary and lacks sanctioning authority or taxation power, the ability to 
promote cooperation is undermined -especially in services where there is heterogeneity in need and 
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resources across the region (Foster 1997, Frug 2002, Warner and Hefetz 2002a). The European 
experience, suggests that broader government structure and institutional design can affect cooperation. 
A key difference between Europe and the US is the higher level of fiscal autonomy and service 
responsibilities in the US and the lower importance of higher tier government grants. Another 
difference is that counties are locally elected bodies in the US whereas in southern Europe (i.e. Spain, 
France) they are appointed from municipal councils in a second-degree election which may promote 
inter-local cooperation. Third, in continental Europe basic local services (solid waste, water, etc.) are 
compulsory for all municipalities so service levels are more homogeneous, facilitating cooperation.  
Inter-municipal cooperation can be an important reform to address challenges of suboptimal 
government size. Geographically, in the US, rates of cooperation are highest among suburbs and rural 
areas and this has been a consistent trend for the last 15 years (Hefetz, Warner and Vigoda-Gadot, 
2012). Inter-municipal cooperation for most services is geographically bounded to municipalities in the 
nearby region. Suburbs represent a market of similar sized municipalities in close proximity where 
cooperation affords suburbs the opportunity to enjoy economies of scale (Warner and Hefetz, 2002a; 
Hefetz, Warner and Vigoda-Gadot, 2012). For rural municipalities inter-municipal cooperation is an 
important alternative to private contracting as low density and high costs limit private competition for 
rural service delivery (Warner, 2006; Mohr et al, 2010; Bel and Fageda, 2011; Hefetz and Warner, 2012). 
In Europe the critical role of scale, externalities and spillovers and local government size is less 
important because many services are handled by higher tiers of government. Thus the European 
research on inter-municipal cooperation is not as concerned with equity and geographic challenges of 
voluntary coordination that so preoccupies the US literature.  
Feiock (2007) has warned that stability of inter-local agreements is undermined by 
heterogeneity among local governments’ partners – but if inter-municipal cooperation is to be a reform 
that addresses scale and equity issues, it will need to develop governance forms that help overcome 
differences among partners. Feiock’s (2007) theory of institutional collective action builds from 
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Ostrom’s (1990) support for polycentrism based on trust, reciprocity and collective benefits, and delves 
into political institutions and the structure of policy networks. Transactions costs matter, but they 
extend beyond the service to the nature of the local governments in the cooperating region (Hefetz and 
Warner, 2012). Proximity and homogeneity in interests, needs and resources facilitate cooperation as 
does institutional homogeneity in budget rules and service requirements. Longer tenure and more 
professional management also facilitate cooperation as this gives time for reciprocal relationships to 
build both weak and strong ties in regional policy networks. 
Cooperation is a form of network governance and the public administration literature is replete 
with examples of the challenges posed by networks where hierarchical control is replaced by horizontal 
collaboration, and command and sanctioning authority is replaced by negotiation and persuasion 
(Milward and Provan, 2000; Salamon, 2002; Goldsmith and Eggers, 2004). Inter-local networks that 
bridge fragmented local government systems are complex (Savitch and Vogel, 2006). Feiock (2007) has 
postulated a theory of institutional collective action that builds from rational choice to explore the 
elements of cooperation. This involves not only the inter-personal relations between network actors 
but regional coordination structures that facilitate collective action (Thurmaier and Wood, 2002). On 
the relational side, trust and norms of reciprocity are important (Frederickson and Smith, 2003; 
Ostrom, 1990) but so too are the reality of differences in wealth, need and preferences within the 
region (Feiock, 2007; Warner and Hefetz, 2002a; 2002b). 
Intermediary governance bodies of local character, such as counties and regional governments, 
exist in many countries. In the US metropolitan planning organizations and regional councils of 
government have emerged to help address coordination issues. An intermediary governance body can 
reduce the transactions costs of negotiating and maintaining cooperative agreements by providing an 
ongoing network for information exchange, and a framework for sharing that builds trust and norms of 
reciprocity that help maintain cooperation over time. Rules or trust can be the basis for coordination. 
While trust breaks down with an increase in the number of actors, formal rules reduce transaction costs 
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and allow a wider number of actors to cooperate. Transactions costs, shared values and norms, and 
social networks, along with geographic and service characteristics are all important factors explaining 
inter-municipal cooperation.  
 
3.3 Governance Arrangement: Coordination and Transactions Costs 
Transaction costs are important in the selection of service delivery arrangement and can be applied to 
government decisions regarding the delivery of public services where institutional arrangements to 
establish and enforce contracts tend to be quite complex (Williamson, 1999) and factors such as 
monitoring and control become central. What matters is not just to minimize production costs, but the 
sum of production and transaction costs. Transaction costs have been applied widely in the analysis of 
cooperation (Brown and Potoski, 2003; Lamothe, Lamothe and Feiock, 2008; Carr, LeRoux, and 
Shrestha, 2009; Levin and Tadelis, 2010; Shrestha and Feiock, 2011; Hefetz and Warner, 2012). Inter-
municipal cooperation may be subject to lower transaction costs than privatization because cooperating 
governments share similar objectives (Brown, 2008; Hefetz, Warner and Vigoda-Gadot, 2014). 
However, transaction costs from cooperation involve information, negotiation, monitoring and agency 
costs that can be quite substantial (Feiock, 2007). Empirical research has shown that inter-municipal 
contracting is preferred to for profit contracting when services have higher transactions costs due to 
asset specificity and lack of competition (Girth et al., 2012; Hefetz and Warner, 2012; Levin and 
Tadelis, 2010). However research has shown principal-agent problems arise with inter-municipal 
cooperation due to weak sanctioning power among municipal partners (Marvel and Marvel, 2007), and 
boundary crossing and coordination problems due to differences in wealth, demographic makeup, 
geographic location and ideology of participating communities (Lowery, 2000; Feiock, 2007). 
Furthermore, attention has to be paid to the existence of political transaction costs (Rodrigues, Tavares 
and Araújo, 2012), because political interaction is always costly (Tavares and Camöes, 2007).  
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Typical principal-agent problems arise with inter-municipal cooperation, because local governments 
act as agents for residents, who are the main stakeholders of service delivery. With cooperation, new 
governance bodies often assume functions to govern the collaboration, be they multi-government 
bodies, separate governments, or boards of managers. The distance between principal and agent 
increases, because a second order principal-agent relationship emerges: the principal is now the 
municipal government (who is in turn the residents’ agent) and the agent is the manager of the 
cooperative agreement. Several factors can work as control mechanisms to improve the alignment 
between the principal and agent. Risk due to problems of credibility and commitment between the 
cooperating partners can increase the need for monitoring and coordination, increasing transaction 
costs and making cooperation more expensive. 
Low transaction costs are a prerequisite for cooperation to be a useful tool in service delivery. This 
involves both the upfront transaction costs municipalities must incur through study, design and the 
transition to the new collaborative form of service delivery, as well as the ongoing transaction costs of 
contract management and monitoring. The transition to cooperative service delivery entails having 
available expertise, background research, capacity, and a potentially complex political process. 
 
4. Empirical evidence on cooperation and costs 
While robust empirical evidence abounds on the effects of local privatization on costs (see Bel and 
Warner, 2008; Bel, Fageda and Warner, 2010), robust statistical evidence on the effects of inter-
municipal cooperation on costs is much more scarce, as pointed out by (Holzer and Fry, 2011: 81) 
when discussing the relationship between shared delivery and efficiency: “The literature was 
disappointingly skimpy on estimating costs savings for different service delivery options.” For the US, 
anecdotal information on savings in a few cases surveyed was provided by Honadle (1984) and Ruggini 
(2006), in the UK, accounting information is provided by the Department for Communities and Local 
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Government, and case studies for Australia do not show cost savings (see Dollery, Akimov and Byrnes, 
2009: 216-218) . 
Eight multivariate empirical works have appeared in the last few years, which provide a 
systematic analysis of the effect of cooperation on costs by means of cost functions of linear type. We 
are aware that we only have available a small number of works to conduct our analysis. Furthermore, 
most of these works, seven, are studies on solid waste collection, because this is one of the services that 
has been the subject of more studies on cost, and because it is a service where cooperation is relatively 
frequent. That said, we believe that this evidence, even if limited in quantity, allows us to identify the 
main characteristics of cost structure and service delivery governance that should be taken into account 
under cooperation. Likewise, this facilitates a better understanding of the importance of differing 
national structures of local government systems on the scope of cooperation reforms, as four different 
countries are covered in this set of studies (Spain, Italy, Norway and the Netherlands). 
Table 1 displays the most important characteristics of the studies, including sample year and 
size, country, service, estimation technique, operationalization of variables related to costs and to 
cooperation, type of institutional arrangement, and results. Most of these works (Bel and Costas, 2006; 
Bel and Mur, 2009; Dijkgraaf and Gradus, 2013; Zafra-Gómez et. al, 2013; Bel, Fageda and Mur, 2014; 
and Dijkgraaf and Gradus, forthcoming) use Cobb-Douglas cost functions, solidly established in the 
literature that analyzes the relationship between privatization of local services and costs. This type of 
cost function analyzes the relationship between the institutional form of service delivery and costs 
controlling for other non-institutional determinants of cost such as population or volume of service, 
density of population, dispersion, frequency of service, etc. Besides these works, two empirical papers 
study the effect of Communautes on total expenditures of French communes, thus trying to analyze the 
degree of substitution between municipal and inter-communal expenses. Guengant and Leprice (2006) 
find that inter-communal expenses do not reduce overall municipal expenditure, but the opposite result 
is found in Frère, Leprince and Paty (forthcoming). These two papers do not specifically analyze the 
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effect of cooperation on the costs of the service(s) subject to shared delivery, thus are not comparable 
to those in table 1. 
(Insert table 1 around here) 
 
Most of the papers from Spain use a regional data base (Catalonia or Aragon), which allows 
them to include many small municipalities in the sample. However, Zafra-Gómez et al. (2013) use a 
much wider national sample, which is more representative of Spain as a whole. Likewise, Dijkgraaf and 
Gradus (2013; forthcoming) use wide national samples of the Netherlands, which are also highly 
representative. Bel, Fageda and Mur (2014) analyze costs from cooperation controlling for production 
form, which works in environments where cooperative provision can be combined with private 
production. Cooperation and privatization are not incompatible in Spain. The county or the provincial 
council decides what form of production is to be used to deliver the service. Recall that municipalities 
are free to retain municipal provision or to engage in inter-municipal cooperation, as this remains a 
municipal responsibility (Bel et al, 2010). Municipalities can cooperate to achieve a better scale of 
operation and thus be more attractive to private producers. Cooperation allows small municipalities to 
reduce transaction costs from contracting out and increase their bargaining power with private 
producers.  
Cooperation is associated with public production in countries like Norway and the Netherlands.  
Sørensen’s (2007) model for Norway is built from the literature on corporate governance, and is 
basically formed of institutional variables, such as competition, concentration, number of municipal 
owners, etc. Garrone, Grilli and Rousseau (2013) estimate cost functions for multi-utility firms in Italy 
(electricity, gas, water and waste). This is the only work that looks beyond the solid waste sector. Most 
works find cooperation is significantly associated with lower costs (Bel and Costas, 2006; Bel and Mur, 
2009; Dijkgraaf and Gradus, 2013; Zafra-Gómez et. al, 2013; and Bel, Fageda and Mur, 2014). 
However, Sørensen (2007) and Garrone, Grilli and Rousseau (2013) find cooperation associated with 
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higher costs, and Dijkgraaf and Gradus (forthcoming) find the difference is not statistically significant. 
Thus, divergence is an interesting result, and several factors could help to explain it.  
First, a limited number of local services are characterized by scale economies. In these cases, 
aggregating the service will reduce the average cost of delivery, as shown in figure 1 above. This is the 
case in solid waste services, which is the focus of most studies reviewed. As observed in recent reviews 
on empirical works on local services privatization and costs (Bel and Warner, 2008; Bel, Fageda and 
Warner, 2010) solid waste and urban water services are the two most important sources of studies, and 
they are usually organized at the local level. These services are often organized via for profit or 
cooperative delivery and paid for via user fees, which leads government accounting bodies to maintain 
data on wide samples of municipalities, a prerequisite to robust multivariate empirical analysis. 
Cooperation is frequent in solid waste in Europe, but this is not the case with water. This explains why 
empirical evidence on costs is most frequently based on the solid waste service. 
Second, economies of scale exist for small municipalities, but not for larger ones. Because of 
this, small municipalities will benefit more than larger ones from cooperation, as the former ones will 
more likely achieve a reduction of the average cost of service delivery. Average municipal size in Spain 
is below 6,000 inhabitants, whereas in Norway it is almost 12,000 inhabitants, double that of Spain. 
This would help explain why studies for Spain tend to result more frequently in cost savings from 
cooperation, compared to those in Norway. In Italy average population is around 7,500. However, as 
noted by Garrone, Grilli and Rousseau (2013) small municipalities are heavily underrepresented in their 
sample of 27 multi-utility firms in Italy, thus there may be limited potential for cost savings from 
cooperation among the larger communities in their sample. Furthermore, in Italy inter-municipal multi-
utilities jointly provide several services, and some of them (gas, electricity, and water) might be 
characterized by economies of density rather than scale economies and scope economies. Contiguity of 
urban areas is more important in economies of density than aggregating output of discontinuous urban 
areas and this might affect the ability of Italian multi-service firms to exploit scale economies. In short, 
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the economic characteristics of services such as gas, electricity and water might help explain why 
intermunicipal cooperation does not result in cost savings in Italy. 
Third, governance of the cooperative arrangement has important differences in these countries. 
In Norway and Italy cooperation has a multi-government character managed by a board of directors, 
whereas cooperation in Spain is typically governed by a single separate government to which 
municipalities have delegated the production of the service(s). Political transaction costs (Tavares and 
Camöes, 2007; Rodrigues, Tavares and Araújo, 2012), tend to be higher with multi-government 
ownership and boards of directors than with single governments. Garrone, Grilli and Rousseau (2013) 
give special attention to concentration of ownership. Cooperation walks a fine line between 
competition and monopoly. What about the nature of the cooperative arrangement, or the structure of 
local government, will ensure that the benefits of cooperation result in cost savings as opposed to cost 
increases? A recent study comparing cooperation in Spain and the Netherlands pointed to the 
importance of local government size, and level of competition in the market in determining whether 
inter-municipal cooperation results in lower costs (Bel et al. 2010). 
Finally, Dijkgraaf and Gradus (forthcoming) include the pricing system used for solid waste 
delivery in each municipality in the Netherlands. They find that unit based pricing is associated with 
lower costs, and that differences in costs between the different institutional forms of delivery tend to 
disappear after controlling for the pricing system. This would explain why significantly lower costs with 
cooperation were found in Dijkgraaf and Gradus (2013), but lower costs under cooperation were not 
significant in Dijkgraaf and Gradus (forthcoming). 
 
5) Discussion and Agenda for Future Research  
Review of the evidence in the previous section offers a first unanticipated and interesting insight. 
Papers that conduct a multivariate empirical analysis on the effects of cooperation on costs are all done 
for European countries, with no exception. In our view, this contrast reflects the different nature of the 
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policy and scholarly debate on inter-municipal cooperation in the US and Europe. In the US several 
services with strong asset specificity, externalities over contiguous areas, and stressful demands (i.e. fire 
departments and roads), and others of high impact on social cohesion (such as education and social 
services) are provided by the municipalities, whereas they are more frequently provided by more 
centralized levels of government (either regional or national) in the EU countries.  
Because of this, the scholarly analysis on inter-municipal cooperation in the US is more closely 
connected to debates on equity, externalities and the need for regional coordination in service delivery. 
The US literature pays more attention to the question of why municipalities engage in cooperation, 
what its objectives are, what drives it and what limitations affect it. By contrast, the scholarly analysis in 
EU countries is focused on outcomes, specifically the economic results of cooperation, rather than 
empirically analyzing why it is undertaken. This may be due to differences in local government structure 
in Europe, e.g. the higher level of centralization of core services, the lower fiscal autonomy of local 
governments and the greater homogeneity of service delivery given compulsory rules regarding local 
government competencies. In the case of the US, however, differences in autonomy, authority and 
services provided make collaboration both more important and more difficult. Heterogeneity in service 
delivery raises the transaction costs of voluntary cooperation for US local governments. In addition, 
there is a lack of systematic cost data for U.S. cities in part because cost savings are not the primary 
objective. 
As discussed in the theory section, several factors are crucial to obtaining costs savings from 
cooperation. Among them, the type of service, the size of output/population, and the transaction costs 
imposed by the institutional design of the cooperative governance arrangement. All these factors are at 
play in explaining the different results in the existing literature: solid waste is more prone to scale 
economies, small municipalities are more likely to benefit from exploiting scale economies, and single 
separated governments are likely to incur lower transaction costs than multi-government bodies with 
external boards of directors. This likely explains why studies on solid waste for Spain consistently yield 
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better results for cooperation than those for Norway and Italy. Of course, the limited evidence 
available prevents us from making more robust claims and generalizations. Still these results offer 
useful insights for policymakers and scholars on where policy implementation and academic research 
should lead. 
 Additional research is needed on the impact of cooperation on costs, especially now as fiscal 
stress is encouraging governments to look to cooperation as a potential solution. The empirical 
techniques and variables to use in the analysis of cost of local services are well known. We believe the 
analysis of the European experiences offers useful guidance for empirical analysis in the US and other 
contexts, provided some differences in the use of concepts are taken into account. Available literature 
already shows that techniques and variables are similar in related areas of study such as privatization 
and costs (see Bel and Warner, 2008; Bel, Fageda and Warner, 2010). Indeed, the main problem is the 
availability of data. In Europe, data on more diverse sectors than solid waste is needed. In the case of 
the US, empirical outcome data on any sector will be extremely useful. Given the heterogeneity of 
governance structure and accounting systems across the states, studies on cost outcomes might best be 
focused at the state rather than the national level. Another challenge for the US is to differentiate 
between more or less formal forms of cooperation and between interlocal contracting and 
intermunicipal joint production, as differences in governance structures between these institutional 
forms might be associated with cost differences. Indeed, such differentiation is important in Europe as 
we have noted that single, separated governments have lower transaction costs than multi-
governmental bodies. 
Eventually, having more empirical papers available in the literature would make possible a 
metaregression analysis of studies on cooperation and costs. This would permit a rigorous comparison 
of costs between the economic effects of cooperation and consolidation. This is critically important 
given current debates in metropolitan service delivery, and more particularly given the fact that quite 
often consolidation and cooperation are seen as alternative tools for confronting similar problems. 
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Table 1: Basic characteristics of the multivariate empirical works on cooperation and costs  
Study Sampl
e size 
Year data 
collection 
Country Regression 
method 
Service Dependent 
variable 
Operationalizatio
n of cooperation 
Institutional 
form 
Result 
Bel & Costas (2006) 186 2000 Spain-
Catalonia 
Log-linear 
regression 
Solid waste Total cost for 
municipality  
Dummy 1-0 Comarcas 
(counties) 
Cooperation 
saves cost 
Sørensen (2007) 211 / 
311 
2005 Norway Linear 
regression 
Solid waste Costs per capita 
/ Fees per 
household 
Dummy 1-0 Inter-municipal 
corporations 
Cooperation 
increases costs 
Bel and Mur (2009) 56 2003 Spain-
Aragón 
Log-linear 
regression 
Solid waste Total costs for 
municipality 
Dummy 1-0 Comarcas 
(counties) 
Cooperation 
saves cost 
Dijkgraaf and 
Gradus (2013) 
431 / 
548 
1998-2010 The 
Netherlands 
Log-linear 
regression 
Solid waste Total cost for 
municipality 
Dummy 1-0 Interlocal 
contracts & 
intermunicipal-
corporations 
Cooperation 
saves cost 
Zafra-Gómez, et al. 
(2013)  
923 2002-2008 Spain Pooled OLS 
and Panel 
Data 
Solid waste Total cost for 
municipality 
Dummy 5-1 Mancomunities, 
consortia & 
provinces 
Cooperation 
saves cost 
Garrone, Grilli and 
Rousseau (2013) 
27 1997-2006 Italy Translogarith
mic function 
(GLS) 
Water, 
electricity, 
gas, waste 
Firm’s Total 
Costs 
Concentration of 
ownership (HHI= 1 
municipality)  
Multi-utility firms Cooperation 
increases cost 
Bel, Fageda & Mur 
(2014) 
85 2008 Spain-
Aragon 
Linear 
regression 
(2SLS) 
Solid waste Total costs for 
municipality 
Dummy 1-0 and 
Interaction 
Coop&(public and 
private delivery) 
Comarcas 
(counties) 
Cooperation 
saves cost 
Dijkgraaf and 
Gradus 
(forthcoming) 
500 1998-2010 The 
Netherlands 
Log-linear 
regression 
Solid waste Total cost for 
municipality 
Dummy 1-0 Intermunicipal-
corporations 
Cooperation 
saves cost, but 
difference is not 
statistically 
significant. 
Note: All works in the table are multivariate econometric studies.  
Source: Authors’. 
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Figure 1: Scale economies and cooperation 
 
 
 
 
Q 
P 
       
DSM   DMM   
       P1 
Qmm Qsm 
AC 
